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Abstract
The resource-constrained nature of IoT objects makes the Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) vulnerable to several attacks. Although RPL specification provides encryption protection to control messages,
RPL is still vulnerable to internal attackers and selfish behaviours. To address the lack of robust security mechanisms
in RPL, we designed a new Metric-based RPL Trustworthiness Scheme (MRTS) that introduces trust evaluation for
secure routing topology construction. Extensive simulations show that MRTS is efficient and performant with respect
to packet delivery ratio, energy consumption, and nodes’ rank changes. In addition, a mathematical modelling analysis
shows that MRTS meets the requirements of consistency, optimality, and loop-freeness, and that the proposed trust-
based routing metric has the isotonicity and monotonicity properties required for a routing protocol. By using game
theory concepts, we formally describe MRTS as a strategy for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and demonstrate its
cooperation enforcement characteristic. Both mathematical analysis and evolutionary simulation results show clearly
that MRTS, as a strategy is an effective approach in promoting the stability and the evolution of the Internet of Things
network.
Keywords: RPL, Secure Routing, Internet of Things, Trust Management, Game Theory, Cooperation Enforcement.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new communica-
tion paradigm that affects our daily lives in many do-
mains, such as healthcare, home and building automa-
tion, automobiles, urban, and industrial appliances. The
IoT-based networks are more likely formed of Low-
power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), composed of vari-
ous heterogeneous wireless technologies (objects), such
as Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags, sen-
sors, actuators, etc. In these technologies, computing
and communication systems are seamlessly embedded
[1]. IoT’s objects are characterised both by their strong
resource constraints and by their lossy communication
links. Indeed, these objects have limited processing
power, memory, and energy supply, in addition to a high
loss rate, a low throughput, a limited frame size, and
short communication ranges [2][3]. Such limitations
raised several challenges for industry and academic re-
search community, for example, scalability, routing, and
security.
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This last decade, several routing solutions for LLNs
were suggested. Finally, the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) ROLL (Routing Over Low power and
Lossy networks) [4] working group has developed and
standardised the Routing Protocol for Low-power and
Lossy Networks (RPL) [5]. One major issue for the
IoT is the routing security that researchers consider
as a critical requirement [3] [6]. In the spate of the
RPL specification defined cryptography-based mecha-
nisms to ensure control messages integrity and con-
fidentiality against outsider attackers [5], nonetheless,
RPL still vulnerable to various known and new internal
threats, that have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture [7][8].
Because trusting the objects participating in the rout-
ing process is crucial for the well-functioning of the net-
work, we focus our research study on addressing RPL
weaknesses in terms of routing security and proposing
a security scheme for RPL based on trustworthiness be-
tween nodes. In this paper, we propose a Metric-based
RPL Trustworthiness Scheme (MRTS) that enables se-
cure routing by avoiding malicious nodes, and calculat-
ing and choosing the most trusted path from the source
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node to the root. We introduced MRTS initially in [9].
Firstly, this paper is a revision1 of our previous work [9]
where new elements and components are added to en-
hance MRTS performance in term of security, lifetime
and routing requirements. Secondly, this paper extends
the work in [9] with a simulation validation and a math-
ematical analysis.
Cooperation and collaboration are considered critical
in the development of trust relationships among par-
ticipating nodes for secure operations of the network
[10]. According to Buttyan et al. [10], cooperation re-
inforces trust because trust is about the ability to pre-
dict the behaviour of another party, where the cooper-
ation makes predictions more reliable. Surely, MRTS
demands nodes to cooperate to improve the detection of
untrusted nodes, and thus to enforce the routing security.
Thus, MRTS can be seen as a strategy in which punish-
ment Mechanism (i.e., isolation of untrusted node) is
introduced to motivate nodes to be cooperative. In this
paper, we demonstrate that in cooperation enforcement,
the MRTS strategy is as good as other famous strategies
like the tit-for-tat and the Spiteful strategies.
We summarise our contributions as follows.
1. We present a revision of MRTS [9]. We added
ETX as a new parameter for trust calculation. We
changed the functionality of the trust metric flag
to make MRTS more flexible (i.e., secure and non-
secure modes). We modified the parent selection
process to extend nodes’ energy.
2. We evaluate MRTS performances and give simula-
tion results.
3. We provide a mathematical analysis of MRTS rout-
ing and its ERNT metric.
4. We perform mathematical analysis and a simula-
tion study of MRTS as a strategy for cooperation
enforcement, using game theory concepts.
This paper is an extension of our previous works [9]
and [11] by adding simulation and mathematical val-
idations. The rest of this paper is organised as fol-
lows.Section 2 presents a background of trust defini-
tion, RPL protocol, and its vulnerabilities. Section 3
sketches the related works for securing RPL. Section 4
gives a presentation of the components and the func-
tioning of MRTS. Section 5 reports simulation-based
performance study, a mathematical analysis, and a dis-
cussion on MRTS and its security features. Section 6
is devoted to mathematical analysis and a simulation
1Throughout this paper, we use the terms enhancement and revi-
sion interchangeably.
study of MRTS as a strategy in the iterated (repeated)
Prisoner’s Dilemma game for cooperation enforcement.
Finally, the last section concludes the paper and gives
future works and perspectives.
2. Background
2.1. Trust and Trust Management
Trust is a subject of strong theoretical significance
and real meaning. It is a very complicated concept that
researchers saw and interpreted in many different ways
under different contexts. One definition of trust is the
relationship between different actors such as persons,
entities, objects or actions. Thus, the trustor evaluates
the trustee to assess its trustworthiness to perform some
actions on its behalf. The evaluation process takes into
consideration the history of the trustee’s behaviour to-
wards parties with which the trustee interacted previ-
ously. In the context of IoT, the trustworthiness (trust
value) of a node is a scalar that defines the observed ex-
periences of the node over a period. It quantifies the
positive and negative interaction of each node towards
its neighbours based on specified properties. In the liter-
ature, there exist different models and methods for trust
management and calculation for IoT. Djedjig et al. [12]
presented more details about trust management proper-
ties and models for IoT based networks.
2.2. The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks
2.2.1. RPL Overview
RPL [5] is the first standardised routing protocol spe-
cially designed for LNN networks. RPL is a proactive
distance-vector routing protocol that constructs a logical
representation of the network topology as a set of Des-
tination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs)
through which data packets are routed. As depicted in
Figure 1, in each DODAG, nodes are connected to the
Border Router (BR) - edge router/gateway. A backbone
link connects the BR to the Internet and other BRs. To
construct the topology, RPL uses DIO (DODAG Infor-
mation Object), DIS (DODAG Information Solicitation)
and DAO (DODAG Destination Advertisement Object)
control messages and a Trickle timer. To support rout-
ing optimisation and calculate the best paths to route
traffic, RPL uses an Objective Function (OF) [13] and
node, link metrics and constraints, or both [14]. In RPL,
each object has a Rank (R), which determines the indi-
vidual position of a node relative to the BR and other
nodes within a DODAG. The Rank rule states that the
Rank should be monotonic; thus, Rank values should
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increase from the BR towards the leaf nodes, and vice-
versa. If inconsistencies happen involving changes in
the topology, the nodes reset the Trickle timer to a lower
value, and thus, control messages transmission rate will
be fastened. Nodes use Global Repair (GR) and Local
Repair (LR) mechanisms to fix links and nodes failures,
and other inconsistencies. Once GR or LG triggered,
the nodes reset their trickle timers and update their re-
spective parents’ lists and Ranks.
Figure 1: RPL Topology and Components.
2.2.2. Routing Attacks against RPL
RPL is vulnerable to a large variety of attacks, which
researchers have treated in the literature [7][8]. Nowa-
days, several classifications for RPL threats exist. In
our earlier study [7], we proposed two main classes: the
Novel RPL Specification-based attacks and the Existing
routing attacks tailored to the context of RPL. The first
class includes the rank, neighbour, and version number
attacks, while the second one includes the hello flood-
ing, selective forwarding, Sybil, wormhole, and Black-
hole attacks. In the following, we give the definitions of
the two attacks addressed in this paper.
1. Rank Attacks: there exist several variants of the
Rank attack, namely Decreased Rank Attack [15],
Rank Attack [16], Worst Parent Attack [17], and
Increased Rank Attack [18]. These attacks lead to
generate loops in the network, to exhaust node re-
sources, and to congest the network. In this paper,
we give particular attention to the decreased rank
attack. In this attack, the malicious node illegit-
imately advertises a better Rank equal to a lower
Rank value inducing other nodes to select it as a
parent.
2. Blackhole Attack [19][20][21]: in this attack, the
malicious node drops all packets (control and data
packets) routed through it. In the literature, re-
searchers consider this attack as a DoS attack. In-
deed, the Blackhole attack is more dangerous if
combined with Rank or sinkhole attacks since the
attacker is in a position where normal nodes route
colossal traffic through it. This attack increases the
number of exchanged DIO messages, which leads
to instability of the network, data packets delay,
and thus resources exhausting.
3. Related Works
Attacks take place at different levels in the IoT infras-
tructure. Although there exist several state-of-the-art
works that address the IoT security, in this section, we
focus on IoT’s networking security, especially the solu-
tions to secure the routing protocol RPL. Several works
have presented in-depth analysis and classifications of
RPL’s vulnerabilities regarding different attacks, such as
Rank, version number, neighbour, Sybil and CloneID,
sinkhole, Blackhole, selective-forwarding, DIS, and
DAO attacks [7][8][18]. Other studies have introduced
several security measures to counter such attacks. Fol-
lowing we classify the proposed security efforts for the
RPL protocol onto two classes: The IDS-based and the
trust-based.
3.1. IDS-based Security Solutions
A growing number of works proposed Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS) as a technique to detect or iso-
late attacks against RPL. For instance, Raza et al. [22]
proposed SVELTE, a hybrid IDS for IP-based IoT,
where IDS modules were placed both in the BR and
in constrained nodes. SVELTE targets spoofed or al-
tered information (Rank attack), sinkhole, and selective-
forwarding attacks. Furthermore, the authors proposed
a distributed mini-firewall to protect the network against
external attackers. However, SVELTE main drawbacks
are the high false detection rate and the lack of DIO
synchronisation. Pongle et al. [23] proposed a hy-
brid anomaly-based IDS to detect wormhole attacks.
Authors used Neighbour Discovery/Verification Based
techniques for the detection of these attacks. In this
solution, the monitoring in-network nodes gather infor-
mation about their respective neighbours and changes
on the network (RSSI) and send them to the BR. This
later analyses received data to detect intruders and then
make decisions. Le et al. [16] proposed a hybrid
specification-based IDS for securing RPL against topol-
ogy attacks (Rank, sinkhole, and neighbour attacks). In
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this approach, nodes monitor routing information con-
veyed in control messages to detect attackers. They used
an Extended Finite State Machine (EFST) with statis-
tic pieces of information about transitions and states
for RPL. In this IDS, a cluster head requests its mem-
bers to report its topology information periodically and
process this information using the EFST. Napiah et
al. [24] proposed a compression header analyser based
IDS (CHA-IDS) to detect HelloFlood, Sinkhole, and
Wormhole attacks in a 6LoWPAN. They used the Best
First Search (BFS), Greedy Stepwise (GS), and the
Correlation-based Features Selection (CFS) algorithm
for feature engineering and selection. Simulation re-
sults showed that the J48 Machine Learning (ML) algo-
rithm performs better than other classifiers for that spe-
cific configuration. Even though this approach presents
a good background for IoT ML-based IDS, still authors
considered a very small network of 8 nodes. Furkan et
al. [25] proposed a Deep Learning (DL) model as IDS
to detect routing attacks against an IoT RPL-based net-
work. Simulation results showed good performance in
term of IDS accuracy. However, the fitting time of the
DL model was too long. Indeed, the machine and deep
learning methods are too greedy in term of computation
and storage for IoT devices.
The proposed IDS solutions for IoT depend on the
availability of information conveyed within some pack-
ets or in datasets generated from exchanged packets.
However, these packets can be lost if an attack forces
nodes to drop their packets or other nodes’ packets, thus
making the overall IDS disturbed. From another side, if
the malicious node is smart and does not trigger the at-
tack continuously, the IDS might not detect it, and thus
the attacker could participate readily in the network op-
erations.
3.2. Trust-based Security Solutions
These last years, more research works are addressing
the problem of trust management for different networks
of the IoT. For instance, authors in [26] and [27] are con-
sidered the pioneers of the concept of distributed IoT
trust management. In the proposed hierarchical trust
management protocol for IoT, each node calculates the
trust level of other nodes using social relationships met-
rics: honesty, cooperativeness, and community-interest,
and relying on both direct service experiences and indi-
rect recommendations, where recommendations are col-
lected at the time nodes encounter each other through
social contacts. One drawback of the suggested proto-
col is that the metrics are calculated using the energy
of the node as a parameter. As a consequence, if a nor-
mal node is surrounded by selfish nodes, it will consume
more energy, and it can be considered as non-trusted
while it is trusted. Furthermore, a node may not collect
enough recommendations to make informed decisions
about other nodes. Chen et al. [28] proposed Commu-
nity of Interest dynamic hierarchical trust management
(COI-HiTrust) protocol that integrates mobility in trust
evaluation, and where trust protocol parameter settings
can be dynamically adjusted in response to changing en-
vironments. Authors used COI-HiTrust in the context
of a MANET network. Authors in [29] proposed a 3-
tier cloud-cloudlet-device hierarchical trust-based ser-
vice management protocol (IoT-HiTrust) that eliminates
the problems of the protocol in [26] and [27]. Authors
used cloud servers to stock many recommendations to-
ward each trustee node.
The above-cited works present robust trust solu-
tions to address security in service-oriented and social-
oriented IoT systems, i.e., for the aim of securing ser-
vice composition and management in the context of
social IoT applications. The proposed schemes dealt
with misbehaving owners of IoT devices that provide
services to other IoT devices in the system. Further-
more, the authors focused on Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) or Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs).
These protocols are based on the work of Bao et al.
[30]. Nevertheless, the authors did not address the trust-
management to secure the RPL routing protocol against
insider attackers. [28] and [29] works differ from our
work as follows.
• Our work aims to propose a solution to secure
routing in RPL-based networks, and not to select
trusted devices according to their services as in
[29].
• In our solution, the IDS is a part of the trust mech-
anism where it plays the role of a detector for the
calculation of honesty component, while in [28]
COI-HiTrust is used as a technique for the detec-
tion of intrusions in a community of interest.
• MRTS differs from the work of Bao et al. [30] and
Chen et al. [28] [29] by the use of the recommen-
dations. Indeed Bao et al. and Chen et al. use
recommendations in the case of n-hop neighbours
(n > 1), while MRTS uses recommendations even
for 1-hop neighbours. This is because the more the
information around a given node, the more other
nodes can judge the certainty about it.
Almost all existing works for trust management in
IoT are based on social IoT networks. Only a few works
applied the trust concept to secure RPL. For instance,
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Karkazis et al. [31] introduced the Packet Forward-
ing Indication (PFI) metric to build trust knowledge as
a trust-related metric for RPL. In this approach, each
node transmits a packet to one of its neighbours and
listens whether this neighbour forwards the packet or
not. Then, it calculates the probability for this packet to
travel along the path successfully. The drawback of this
method is the fact that each node takes a decision based
only on its knowledge. Thus, if this node misbehaves,
it will choose a failing path rather than a trusted one.
Djedjig et al. [11] introduced a new trust-based metric
for the construction of the RPL topology. In this ap-
proach, nodes cooperate to calculate trust metric of their
respective neighbours based on nodes behaviours and
some trust components (energy, honesty). One draw-
back of the solution is that the authors did not consider
the trust value along the path (trust inference problem),
which induce to not selecting the most secure paths.
Khan et al. [32] proposed a centralised trust-based
model for managing the reputation of every node partic-
ipating in RPL-based network. In this model, each node
relies on packets routed across the network to calculate
direct trust for other nodes, thus elaborating positive and
negative experiences with other nodes. The gathered
trust information is then transmitted to a central entity,
which evaluates the interactions between network nodes
and gives them a global reputation. This solution uses
direct trust exclusively, which makes it vulnerable to at-
tacks related to trust mechanisms, such as bad-mouthing
and good-mouthing attacks. Airehrour et al. [33][34]
proposed SecTrust-RPL: a trust-aware RPL routing pro-
tocol to secure RPL from routing attacks. In SecTrust,
the trust calculation process evaluates the trustworthi-
ness of a node based on direct and indirect packet for-
warding behaviour between linked and 2-hops nodes,
respectively. Although SecTrust uses indirect trust ob-
servation, a node recommendation depends only on the
neighbour of its indirectly linked neighbours (the parent
of its parent). In other words, the indirect trust of a node
is calculated based only on one recommendation of the
intermediate neighbour, which makes it vulnerable to
Bad-mouthing and Good-mouthing attacks. Seyyed and
Fereidoon [35] proposed DCTM-IoT, a dynamic and
comprehensive trust model for IoT which have a multi-
dimensional vision of trust. The authors integrated sev-
eral parameters in trust calculation, such as packet for-
warding indicator, ETX, energy, and mobility. Besides,
the nodes calculate trust using direct and indirect obser-
vations from neighbours. The authors claim that their
programmed code size (48.28kbyte) is less than the ob-
jects’ (Tmote Sky) available memory (48kbyte) which
is not valid. From one side, too much information (his-
torical) are used in this model and need to be stored
and handled, thus making the solution not lightweight
for constrained objects. From another side, the authors
did not present nor how they integrated the model to
RPL (recommendations, trust propagation, new objec-
tive function), neither how they used the detection of
attacks with the trust calculation process. Lahbib et al.
[36] proposed LT-RPL, Link reliable and Trust aware
model for RPL protocol. In this approach, periodically,
nodes send the node ID, neighbour ID, remaining en-
ergy percentage, the packet forwarding ratio, the Packet
Reception Ratio(PRR), the Packet Error Rate (PER), the
Expected Transmission Count (ETX), the transmission
delay as well as the entity time to a trust manager. The
trust manager stores trust-related data and evaluates the
trust of each node. Authors did not explain how they
calculated the recommendations. The proposed trust
mechanism can counter grey-hole and black-hole at-
tacks; however, there is not an IDS or a mechanism to
detect other attacks such as version number and Sybil
attacks. Besides, since the trust manager handles the
storage and computation tasks, this solution is vulnera-
ble to a one-point of failure. Kiran et al. [37] proposed
a trust-based DDOS attack detection approach. The au-
thors used packet frequency within a time interval as
a trust indicator. The root node calculates the data fre-
quency rate and maintains lists of nodes that crossed this
rate for several intervals. Each time a node appears in
a list, its trust value diminishes. When the trust value
is under a threshold, the node will be classified as mali-
cious, and the root node sends its identity to other nodes.
The nodes receiving the malicious node identity, dis-
card it from the routing operation. From one side, this
approach can only detect DDOS attack. From another
side, it is centralised making it vulnerable to a one-point
of failure.
As highlighted above, the proposed security models
for RPL focus either on attack detection or on trust
management. In the case of IDS-based solutions, ma-
licious (i.e., untrusted) nodes could divert the IDS, and
thus could be selected in the routing process. Also,
even though the IDS can detect and isolate attackers,
still the selected path is not the most secure since some
nodes could be, for example, selfish. In the case of
trust-based solutions, some of the proposed solutions
use only packet forwarding (or packets rate) as trust in-
dicator parameter2, which is not enough to assess the
node’s trustworthiness. Other solutions do not take into
consideration the quality of a path in term of QoS, while
2Throughout this paper, we use the terms parameters, criteria, and
components interchangeably in the context of trust evaluation.
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others do not use mechanisms to detect several types of
attacks to secure the routing paths strongly.
To benefit from the advantages of both IDS-based
and trust-based solutions, avoid their disadvantages, and
solve both network QoS and security requirements for
an RPL-based network, we propose the Metric-based
RPL Trustworthiness Scheme (MRTS); an RPL secure
scheme that integrates both trust-management and IDS
techniques and uses both QoS metrics and selfishness
and honesty3 parameters in trust computation. The
MRTS trust-mechanism cooperates with an IDS, which
monitors and detects malicious nodes, and thus trans-
lates it to an honesty parameter.
4. Metric-based RPL Trustworthiness Scheme
MRTS is a cooperation based trust mechanism in
which each node evaluates the behaviour and calculates
the trustworthiness of its neighbouring nodes relying
not only on its direct observations but also on its neigh-
bours’ indirect observations, as presented in [9]. The
more the information around a given node, the more
other nodes can judge the certainty about it.
One issue of MRTS as it is defined in [9] is that it
relies only on node metrics (energy, honest and selfish-
ness) to select the best bath to route traffic. If nodes
are honest and are not selfish then, the energy will be
the principal metric to select the parent, and thus some
nodes along the selected trusted path will consume more
energy than other nodes, which results in unbalanced
energy consumption, thus reducing the lifetime of those
nodes. Furthermore, MRTS does not consider link met-
rics, thus reducing the routing quality, such as the packet
delivery ratio. Nevertheless, link metrics are essential
to assess the reliability of the route. This routing prop-
erty is essential for IoT applications since reliable routes
provide a high delivery ratio. Researchers proposed sev-
eral methods to estimate the reliability of a route, such
as the Received Signal Strength (RSS), the Link Qual-
ity Level(LQL), and the expected number of retransmis-
sions (ETX) [38]. ETX metric estimates the average
number of transmissions and retransmissions required
to send a data packet to a neighbour. ETX is one of the
widely used link metrics to enhance RPL performances,
where the lower the ETX, the better the quality of the
link. In addition, there exist several lightweight imple-
mentations of ETX for the RPL routing protocol.
For the above-presented arguments, and to balance
the energy consumption of the nodes while promoting
3The honesty parameter indicates if a node is malicious or not.
routes with higher packets delivery ratio, we extended
MRTS with the ETX metric.
Figure 2 resumes how MRTS has integrated ERNT
-the new trust-based metric- to DIO messages. In the
present work, we changed the use of the (1 bit) flag
T (See Figure 2) to indicate the security status (pol-
icy) of the network. Thus, when T is set to 1, the ac-
tive mode is enabled, and the nodes perform the secu-
rity check. Whereas, when T is set to 0, the passive
mode is enabled, and the nodes do not perform any se-
curity check. For an in-depth understanding of MRTS
and ERNT object, readers can refer to [9]. Algorithm
1 summarises the overall functioning of MRTS using
ERNT, while Table 1 presents different notations used
to describe MRTS.
4.1. Trust Metric Parameters
MRTS uses a combination of four parameters to eval-
uate nodes’ trustworthiness: selfishness, honesty, ETX,
and energy. Still, MRTS is flexible and adjustable by
adding or removing behavioural components specific
for a given IoT application.
4.1.1. Energy
The energy of the node is a QoS trust component. It
refers to the level of expectation of node i that the node
j has sufficient energy to achieve its functionalities. The
energy trust between node i and node j is the remain-
ing energy (ER) percentage of the node j estimated by
the node i and vice versa. In IoT, the nodes consume
mainly their energy while receiving and sending pack-
ets. There exist different approaches to calculate the en-
ergy. According to the energy model in [40], the energy
consumed by a node i sending k bits data to the node j,
denoted by Emt, is calculated according to equation 1.
Eelec is the electronics energy (i.e. the energy required
for the transmitter as well as the receiver circuitry), Eamp
is the energy dissipation for transmitting amplifier, and
d is the distance from node i to node j. The energy
consumed by node j receiving the k bits data, denoted
by Emr, is calculated according to equation 2. In RPL
topology, every node communicates with its neighbours
and sends data with the power level corresponding to
the communication range of the node. Therefore, d is
equal to the communication range.
Emt(i) = k ∗ (Eelec + Eamp ∗ d2) (1)
Emr(i) = k ∗ Eelec (2)
Initially, ER(i)(t) is equal to the maximum energy Emax,
i.e., at t = 0, ER(i)(0) = Emax. The energy spent by a
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Figure 2: ERNT Object and ERNT sub-objects within the DIO DAG-Metric-Container Option
node i is the sum of the energy consumed in message
transmission, and the energy consumed in message re-
ception. Thus, the node i calculates its remaining energy
as is given in equation 3.
ER(i) = ER(i) − (Emt(i) + Emr(i)) (3)
Each node reports its residual energy to its neighbours
periodically. The energy trust value TERij ∈ [0, 1]
is equal to the ratio ERij(t) and Emax as in equation
4, where ERij(t) = min(ERreported(t),ERestimated(t) and






A selfish node is a node that intends to limit its re-
source expenditure while attempting to consume the re-
sources of others. It can be calculated as a distributed
and collaborative score. By using techniques such as
overhearing and snooping [41], the node i evaluates the
node j during a period P and decides if j is selfish or
not. Assuming that an application requires minimum
energy denoted by Emin. If ER(i)(t) is greater than Emin,
the node i behaves correctly; if ER(i)(t) is less or equal
to Emin, it does not take part in forwarding packets any
longer and uses, for example, its energy for transmis-
sions of its packets, which implies it is more likely to
become selfish. Therefore, during the trust calculation
phase, MRTS allows some degree of selfishness for the
nodes to save their resources. Consequently, each node
i increments the number N of time another node j does
not cooperate N = N +1 in two cases: i) in the first case,
the node j dropped data packets and ERij(t) > Emin. ii) in
the second case, node j dropped control packet whatever
its ERij value (this is because even if the remaining en-
ergy of the node j is less than the minimum energy, it is
not tolerated to drop control packets since their critical
importance for the network). When the number N ex-
ceeds a threshold Tselfish, the node i considers the node
j selfish (Equation 5, where N is reset at the end of the
period P.). This way, the nodes find a trade-off between
energy and selfishness.
T S el f ish,newi j (t) =
 0 if N(t) ≥ Tsel f ish1 − ( N(t)Tsel f ish ) else. (5)
4.1.3. Honesty
The honesty parameter signals whether a node is ma-
licious or not. Hence, the node i evaluates the node j be-
haviour to decide if j is compromised or not. To this end,




MRTS Metric-based RPL Trustworthiness Scheme
ERNT Extended RPL Node Trustworthiness: Trust object that conveys trust values and related in-
formation, where T field for setting the security mode, P flag to indicate the parent status
(path cost), NT flag to indicate the trust value, and NID to indicate the node identifier
TOF Trust Objective Function
ETX Expected Transmission Count
ER Remaining Energy
TDirectij (t) Measures Direct Trust of node i towards node j at time t
TRecomkj (t) Recommendation of node k towards node j at time t received in ERNT objects
Tij(t) Measures Trust of node i towards node j at time t using direct trust and recommendations
TXij(t) Measures Trust of node i towards node j at time t for the component X ∈
{honesty, sel f ish, energy, ET X}. These correspond to THonestyij (t), T





w1, w2, w3, w4 weights associated to honesty, selfishness, energy, and ETX parameters, respectively
ERij(t) Remaining Energy assessment of node i toward node j at time t
TSelfish Selfishness threshold. The number of time a node is allowed to not forwarding other nodes
packets
TTrust Trust threshold
P Monitoring period for selfishness assessment
PCi Measures the path cost of the node i. This corresponds to the minimum of on-path nodes’
trust values from the source node i to the destination BR
SOP Set Of Parent
MRHOF-RPL The Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function. The objective function that selects
routes that minimize ETX
based on a set of anomaly detection rules [22][23]. In
MRTS, each node i implements an IDS to monitor and
detect malicious behaviours. If the IDS triggers an alert
against a node j, the monitoring node i considers the
node j dishonest and attributes to it an honesty-trust-
value of 0 as in equation 6. The details of attacks de-
tections by IDS are beyond the scope of this paper.
T Honesty,newi j (t) =
 0 if node j misbehaves1 else. (6)
4.1.4. ETX
ETX is a QoS trust component. ”The ETX of a path
is the expected total number of packet transmissions
(including retransmissions) required to successfully de-
liver a packet along that path” [42]. It is a reliabil-
ity metric used to enable routing protocols to find high-
throughput routes, and thus to reduce energy consump-
tion. To calculate TET Xij (t) , ETX(t) is firstly normalized
to [0, 1] using the Min-Max-Normalization method in
equation 7, where ETXmin = 0 and ETXmax = 255 (as
normalized in ContikiRPL implementation [39]). Then,








TETXij (t) = 1 − ETX(t) (8)
4.2. Trust Evaluation
The trust value of a node, in the MRTS mechanism,
is a combination of both direct observation and indirect
recommendations as follows.
4.2.1. Direct Trust
Each node evaluates the trust value, Tij(t) of its 1-
hop neighbour at time t. There exist several methods
to calculate the trust value of an entity (in this case, a
node), such as belief theory, Bayesian systems, Fuzzy
logic, and weighted sum. Because RPL’s objects have
limited storage and processing capacities, we chose the
weighted sum method to evaluate nodes’ trustworthi-
ness. We rely on the work of Bao et al. [30] to calcu-
late direct trust, as depicted in equation 9 [30]; where
w1, w2, w3 and w4 are weights associated with hon-
esty, selfishness, energy, and ETX parameters. We use
8
Algorithm 1 MRTS Decision Process
Require: NodesList,NeighboursList,TTrust,TS el f ish,
w1,w2,w3,w4, P, α
Ensure: Pre f erredParent,Rank
if NeighboursList = ∅ then
Construct the topology according to MRHOF-RPL
in ContikiRPL implementation [39]
else
while 1 do
if ERNT.T = 0 (passive mode) then
Construct the topology according to
MRHOF-RPL
else {ERNT.T = 1 (active mode)}
for all j ∈ NeighbourList do
(Calculate Direct Trust)









TETXij (t)⇐ 1 − ETXj(t)
TSelfish,newij (t)⇐ 1 − (
N
( t)Tselfish)
THonesty,newij (t)⇐ {0, 1}
Execute equation 9
Update Trust Table
(T Honestyi j (t),T





for all j ∈ NeighbourList do
(Calculate Indirect Trust using recommen-
dations)
Execute equation 11, where T recomk j (t) =
ERNT.NT
Update Trust Table (Ti j(t))
Update ParentList (Ti j(t) ≥ TTrust)
end for
From ParentList, Select Ti j(t) with greater
PCi
Update Rank




return Pre f erredParent, Rank
equation 10 [30] to evaluate each behavioural parameter
X ∈ {Honesty; S el f ish}, where ∆t is the trust update in-
terval, TXij (t − ∆t) is the old observation, and α ∈ [0, 1].
If α tends to 1, then trust relies more on new observa-
tions. Otherwise, if α tends to 0, then trust relies more
on old observations. Since the remaining energy reflects
the ability of a node to achieve its functionalities and
ETX reflects the status of the link, the trust calculation
for both rely only on new observations, as presented in
sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.4, respectively.
T Directi j (t) = w1T
Honesty
i j (t) + w2T
S el f ish
i j (t)
+w3T ERi j (t) + w4T
ET X
i j (t)
w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 = 1
(9)
TXij (t) = αT
X,new
ij (t) + (1 − α)T
X
ij (t − ∆t) (10)
4.2.2. Indirect Trust
Because MRTS is a cooperative mechanism aiming
to select the most secure path toward the root, after cal-
culating the direct trust for each neighbour j, the node i
uses the trust values received within the DIO messages
(i.e., in the ERNT objects) from its neighbours k (rec-
ommendations received from recommenders k) at time
t to calculate the final trust value of the node j, as in
equation 11; where the final trust value is the average of
the direct trust value calculated according to equation 9
and all recommendations received for that neighbour j
in ERNT objects.
Tij(t) = Avg(TDirectij (t) + T
Recom
kj (t)) (11)
If the node i receives recommendations for nodes that
are not 1-hop neighbours, it will ignore them.
4.3. Trust Propagation and Update
4.3.1. Trust Propagation
In MRTS, nodes exchange, share, and update trust in-
formation through the quantitative and dynamic trust the
RPL Node Trustworthiness metric; ERNT. The ERNT
metric is an object, which is carried and propagated
through the DAG Metric Container [5][14] of the DIO
message [9]. As depicted in Figure 2, a set of ERNT
sub-objects form the ERNT object. MRTS uses the
ERNT object both as a constraint and as a recorded met-
ric. The BR uses an ERNT sub-object as a constraint to
indicate the trust threshold (TTrust) that nodes must use
to include or eliminate nodes that are not trustworthy.
Besides, the BR and each node participating in the con-
struction of RPL and following MRTS uses ERNT as
a recorded metric, by inserting one ERNT sub-object (a
record) for each calculated (final) trust value, in addition
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to the path cost. Indeed, the path cost value represents
the preferred parent’s trust value.
4.3.2. Trust Update
MRTS updates trust values either periodically or re-
actively. The periodic trust update is time-driven, where
MRTS uses the trickle timer for sending DIO messages
as a regulator, while the reactive trust update is even-
driven, where MRTS uses global repair and local repair
events as triggers. In our solution, when the IDS rises
an alarm (detects attacks) or if the TSelfish is reached, the
local repair or global repair is triggered. Otherwise, the
trickle timer regulates the update.
When a node n receives DIO messages from its
neighbours, it uses the information conveyed in these
DIO messages to update its routing table. It calculates
the trust values of its neighbours using the direct assess-
ments and recommendations received in DIO messages
(according to section 4.2). It then selects a set of trusted
parents allowing it to reach the BR. It calculates the path
cost through each potential parents and selects as pre-
ferred parent the one with the highest path cost value
(according to section 4.4.1), which ensures the most
trusted and reliable traffic routing to the BR. Finally, it
generates and broadcasts a new DIO message contain-
ing the calculated trust values for each of its neighbours.
All the neighbouring nodes repeat the process until the
DODAG is reconstructed.
Once the construction is completed, the maintenance
begins respecting the Trickle timer. The timer reg-
ulates the transmission rate of the control messages.
Thus, in the stable state, the trust update interval of the
trickle timer increases, and the transmission rate will
be slowed, which signifies fewer control messages, and
thus less computation (i.e., the network consumes less
energy, memory and CPU). Otherwise, if there are in-
consistencies (e.g., attack detection, selfish behaviour
detection, and a new node joining the DODAG), which
involve changes in the topology, the Trickle timer will
be reset to a lower value, and transmission rate will be
fastened, which implies more control messages and thus
more computation.
To reduce the computation cost in terms of energy
consumption due to trust update overheads, MRTS
smooths out a small path cost (trust) increase or de-
crease. In the proposed solution, we consider a hystere-
sis threshold of 0,15 to avoid frequent parent changes,
which helps maintain stability and conserve energy.
4.4. Attackers Isolation and Parent Selection
4.4.1. Parent Selection
The Trust Objective Function (TOF) of MRTS imple-
ments both nodes isolation and parent selection proce-
dures. TOF is composed of two steps: the topology ini-
tialisation step (neighbours discovery) and the context-
aware adaptive security execution step. The nodes
execute the first step at deployment because they do
not know their neighbours and thus could not evaluate
their trustworthiness regarding honesty and selfishness.
Since at deployment, all nodes have the same initial en-
ergy, the only parameter to use to construct the RPL
topology is ETX along the path. We used ContikiRPL
built-in function to calculate ETX. The preferred parent
is the one with minimum ETX value, where ETX is cal-
culated as the sum of ETX along the path (from the BR
to the parent node).
After the initialisation, each node knows its neigh-
bours. If secure mode is not activated (T flag set to 0
in the ERNT sub-object), the only parameter to use is
ETX as in the first step, and the nodes use TOF to find
best paths by selecting parents with minimum ETX val-
ues. If secure mode is activated, each node evaluates
the path cost, selects a set of parents having trust value
greater or equal to the threshold TTrust, and selects its
preferred parent. There exist several ways to compute
path cost using a trust metric, which is known as the
trust inference problem. According to TOF, each node i
calculates its path cost, PCi, through each reachable po-
tential parent j. PCi is a scalar value representing node
characteristics along the end-to-end path. To meet the
MRTS routing requirements of consistency, optimality,
and loop-freeness [43], TOF defines the path cost PCi
as the minimum trust value of on-path nodes’ from the
source node i to the destination BR. Thus, the node i se-
lects its preferred parent as the parent who is in the path
having the highest path cost, where the best path is the
one with the highest minimum trust value [9]. To sim-
plify, we calculate PCi as the minimum value between
the potential parent path cost PCj and Tij(t) for that par-




The node i will change its current preferred parent with
a new preferred parent only if the path cost through this
new parent is higher than the currently selected parent
by at least the hysteresis threshold of 0,15. Unlike in
[9], if some candidate paths have the same path costs
then, the node i will choose as the preferred parent, the
one having the higher remaining energy.
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4.4.2. Attackers Isolation
Several methods exist to isolate untrusted node from
participating in network operations. In MRTS, each
node maintains a blacklist with the collaboration of the
IDS. Once a node is classified as untrusted, it is added to
that blacklist. As a result, normal nodes ignore all data
and control packets coming from the blacklisted nodes




We studied the MRTS performances and compared
them to MRHOF-RPL and SecTrust-RPL (SecTrust for
short) performances. We calculated the average packet
delivery ratio (%), the average energy consumption, and
the average rank changes corresponding respectively to
the ratio of the packets delivered to total packets sent,
the average rate of energy consumption by all nodes in
the network, and the average number of parent switches.
For our simulations, we used the lightweight and open
source Contiki 2.7/Cooja simulator [39]. We simulated
a network of 30 nodes with one BR placed in the cen-
tre and 29 Sky mote (TelosB) nodes senders placed
randomly around the BR. Each Sky mote is powered
by an 8MHz, 16-bit Texas Instruments MSP430 micro-
controller with 10kByte of RAM and 48kByte of flash
memory. 3 of the 29 nodes are attackers planted ran-
domly within the network, which trigger Rank or Black-
hole attacks. Table 2 shows the simulation parameters.
We executed the simulations ten times with three dif-
ferent topologies, and we averaged the outputs of the
simulations.
We set the trust threshold TTrust to 0.5, the selfishness
threshold TSelfish to 5, and α to 0.75. Because we be-
lieve that all four factors are equally important to select
secure routes that respect good QoS, initially, we set the
weights w1, w2, w3 and w4 equally to 0.25. As in this
study we focus on the security issues for RPL routing,
during the simulation, if the IDS detects a node as mali-
cious, the normal nodes will adjust the weights associ-
ated to the malicious node such as w1 to 1, and w2, w3
and w4 equally to 0. Likewise, if a node detects another
node as selfish, the normal node will adjust the weights
associated to the selfish node such as w2 to 1, and w1,
w3 and w4 equally to 0.
In the simulation, we used both time-driven and
event-driven update. The computation process is trig-
gered according to the trickle timer (time-driven) and if
the IDS sends an alert or if the TSelfish is reached (event-
driven).




Number of nodes 30
Network area 100m*100m
Range of nodes RX:50%, TX: 50m, in-
terference: 60m
Radio medium model UDGM: Distance Loss
Traffic rate 1 packet sent every 10
seconds
Number of attacker nodes 3
Attacks Rank/Blackhole





Rank Changes. Figure 3 shows the average rank
changes rate for MRHOF-RPL, SecTrust, and MRTS
under Rank and Blackhole attacks. As the simulation
progresses the average frequency of rank changes for
MRHOF-RPL under both attacks is very high (Black-
hole attack: 300 times the first 30mn to 450 times,
and Rank attack: 120 changes the first 30mn to 380
changes). Indeed, the high rate of rank changes is due
to a high rate of parent changes to handle topology in-
stability caused by both attacks. Even though SecTrust
shows significant improvement regarding the network
stability over MRHOF-RPL, MRTS shows better results
inducing more stability (Blackhole attack: 60 first 30mn
to 80, and Rank attack: 50 first 30mn to 40).MRTS per-
forms better than SecTrust because nodes collaborate
to detect and isolate attackers quickly, which helps to
maintain the stability of the network.
Packet Delivery Ratio. In addition to network conges-
tion and packet collision, it can be observed from Fig-
ure 4 that the effects of Blackhole and Rank attacks on
packet delivery ratio for MRHOF-RPL are disastrous
(25-40%). Several causes can explain the observations.
For instance, the fact normal nodes choose malicious
nodes as a preferred parent to forward their packets, and
the deletion of control packets making the topology un-
stable and unavailable. In contrary, MRTS maintained
the packet delivery ratio quite high (up to 90%) since
it uses IDS to detect attacks and provides a new rout-
ing scheme to isolate malicious nodes and maintain a
secure topology. As a result, attacks on MRHOF-RPL
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Figure 3: Average Node Rank Changes under Blackhole and Rank
attacks for MRTS MRHOF-RPL, and SecTrust.
cause significant damages compared to MRTS. We can
see that MRTS shows better packet delivery ratio com-
pared to SecTrust. These results are related to the rank
changes rate where MRTS provides more stable net-
work over SecTrust, thus reducing packet loss.
Energy Consumption. In MRHOF-RPL network, some
nodes consume more energy than others do because
they tend more often to be chosen as preferred par-
ent relying on their ETX; this is an issue since the
higher energy cost to the chosen parents affects the en-
tire network’s lifetime. As depicted in 3 and Figure5,
when MRHOF-RPL network is under attacks, nodes
consume more energy due to topology instability and
rank changes rate (i.e., due to parent changes). We
explain the instability of the network by the fact that
MRHOF-RPL does not have any mechanism to handle
attacks. From Figure 5, we notice that the first 20-30mn,
MRHOF-RPL and SecTrust consumed lower energy
than MRTS. After some time, MRTS performed bet-
ter because energy consumption is much more balanced
among different nodes. The performance of MRTS is
due to the fact, in addition to security (selfishness and
honesty) and link quality (ETX) parameters, our solu-
Figure 4: Average Packet Delivery Ratio under Blackhole and Rank
attacks for MRTS, MRHOF-RPL, and SecTrust.
tion takes into account the remaining energy for each
node in routing decision. Indeed, under attacks, MRTS
consumes the most energy in calculation and DIO trans-
missions, but once the malicious nodes detected and
isolated, the topology becomes more stable, and thus
the energy consumption rate decreases. Furthermore, as
already stated, if two candidate parents have the same
trust values, the node selects the one having the highest
remaining energy.
5.2. MRTS Requirement
To forward packets to the border router, RPL can use
either hop-by-hop forwarding scheme or source rout-
ing. Furthermore, since RPL is a distance-vector rout-
ing protocol, it uses the Bellman-Ford algorithm to cal-
culate path cost [44]. In a weighted directed graph, this
algorithm computes the shortest paths from a source
node to a destination node. In this section, we validate
MRTS relying on the study of Yang et al. [43]. Accord-
ing to the authors, a routing protocol consists of two
components: a path calculation algorithm and a packet-
forwarding scheme. Besides, a routing protocol needs
three requirements to operate properly: consistency, op-
timality and loop-freeness. In this section, we demon-
strate that MRTS combining ERNT, MRTS’s Bellman-
Ford algorithm [9], and either hop-by-hop forwarding
scheme or source-routing meets these different require-
ments.
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Figure 5: Average Energy Consumption over Time for MRTS,
MRHOF-RPL, and SecTrust.
5.2.1. Network Model
MRTS based network is defined as a directed
weighted graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes,
and E is the set of edges representing links between
neighbouring nodes. Each edge, e = (i, j) is associ-
ated to a positive weight corresponding to Tij, where
e ∈ E, i, j ∈ V , and Tij is the trust evaluation of node
i for its neighbour node j. Traffic within the network
is multipoint-to-point, where all source nodes send data
to a single destination node (BR). Thus, traffic is trans-
mitted upward from source nodes un to a destination u1,
where u1 is the BR. A path p from un to u1 is denoted as
p < un, u1 >= (un, un-1, ..., u1). next(p, uk) denotes the
next-hop of uk on p < un, u1 >, where k = n, n− 1, ..., 1.
In MRTS, next(p, uk) represents the preferred parent (1-
hop: PPk) that uk stores in its routing table and uses to
forward traffic (i.e., next(p, uk) = PPk). The path cal-
culation algorithm of MRTS routing protocol (MRTS’s
Bellman-Ford algorithm [9]) is represented by a func-
tion MRTS(G,f,s,BR) that returns a path p < s, BR >
from the source node s to the BR. In addition, we denote
S P(p < un, u1 >, v, u1) the sub-path of path p < un, u1 >
between on-path nodes v and u1. In our network model,
we consider two kinds of nodes: trusted and untrusted
nodes. The first category represents legitimate nodes,
with trust values Tij ≥ TTrust. The second one represents
nodes with trust values Tij < TTrust.
5.2.2. Consistency
According to [43], a routing protocol is consistent
if whatever a node along a given path, the packet for-
warding decision is consistent with each node in that
path. In other words, if a node un decides to forward
packets through the path p < un, u1 >= (un, un-1, ..., u1),
other on-path-p < un, u1 > nodes should forward pack-
ets through p-subpaths. It seems obvious that MRTS is
consistent. For source routing, on-path nodes forward
packets relying on packets headers, and thus, routing
consistency is systematically satisfied. For hop-by-hop
routing, because in MRTS the routing tree is constructed
from the BR to leaf nodes, each intermediate node is, in
fact, a preferred parent of each sending node along a
given path. Hence, if a node selects a preferred parent
as its next-hop (next(p, un) = un-1), it selects automat-
ically the sub-path S P(p < un, u1 >, un-1, u1) = p <
un-1, u1 >= (un-1, ..., u1) through that parent un-1 to for-
ward packets. The process is recursive for each node on
the sub-path.
5.2.3. Optimality
A routing protocol is optimal if it routes the traffic
along the best path for every pair of nodes within the
network [43]. MRTS uses MRTS(G,f,s,BR) path calcu-
lation algorithm allowing a source node s to calculate
path cost (denoted PCx) for each path px < s, BR > to
the BR, where x is the number of paths. For instance,
if we consider three possible paths p1, p2, and p3, with
PC1 = 0.5, PC2 = 0.8, and PC3 = 0.7 then, according to
section 4.4, s will select p2 as the best path to route the
traffic.
5.2.4. Loop-freeness
A routing protocol is said to be loop-free if it does
not create any packet forwarding loop. Besides, if the
routing protocol uses hop-by-hop routing and Bellman-
Ford algorithm to calculate valid paths, consistency is
sufficient to ensure loop-freeness [43]. According to
our analysis, MRTS is consistent, and consequently, it is
loop-free. Otherwise, after the selection of the best path,
the source node calculates its rank using the rank of its
selected parent. If a node receives a DIO message from
another node having a rank value greater than its rank
value, the receiving node will discard the DIO message,
and thus, will never select a child as a parent; therefore,
loops will be avoided. In the case of source-routing, a
source node can eliminate loops.
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5.3. ERNT Mathematical Model
To ensure the proper operation of a given routing pro-
tocol (i.e. consistency, optimality and loop-freeness),
authors in [43] identify the properties that a routing
metric should have: isotonicity and monotonicity. The
monotonic property could ensure the convergence of the
routing algorithm, while the isotonicity property essen-
tially affects the order of the paths weights and could
ensure their convergence is optimal for distance vec-
tor protocols like RPL. As explained in [43][45][46],
we represent a routing metric as an algebra on top of a
quadruplet (S ,⊕, f ,≤), where S is the set of all paths, f
is a function that maps a path to a path cost, ≤ repre-
sents a total order of costs, and ⊕ is the path concate-
nation operation. According to the proved Lemma 2
in [43] ”if for every source s ∈ V, destination d ∈ V
the path weight structure (S ,⊕, f ,≤) is left-isotonic and
left-monotonic, there exists a lightest path from s to d
such that all its sub-paths with source s are also light-
est paths. Such a lightest path is called a D-lightest
path”. For ERNT metric, the algebraic path weight
structure is (S ,⊕, f (max),≤) where f (max) = max(p)
is the maximum trust value (1 − Tij(t)) along the path
p. The order relation for ERNT is ≤, to minimise the
trust of different paths px. Based upon the proved The-
orems 7, 8 and 9 in [43], and given that MRTS uses
MRTS’s Bellman-Ford algorithm for path calculation
[9], it is enough to demonstrate that ERNT is left iso-
tonic and left monotonic for calculating lightest paths.
In the case of source-routing, it is enough to demon-
strate that ERNT is left isotonic
5.3.1. Isotonicity
A routing metric is left isotonic if the order rela-
tion between two paths is preserved if a common third
path prefixes them. Formally, the algebraic structure
(S ,⊕, f ,≤) is left isotonic if ∀a, b, c ∈ S , f (a) ≤ f (b)⇒
f (c ⊕ a) ≤ f (c ⊕ b). This means, (ERNT,⊕, f (max),≤)
is left isotonic if ∀a, b, c ∈ S ,max(a) ≤ max(b) ⇒
max(c ⊕ a) ≤ max(c ⊕ b).
Let consider two given paths a and b so that max(a) ≤
max(b). For a given prefixed path c, three cases could
occur:
1. In the case max(c) ≤ max(a) ≤ max(b) we have:
max(c ⊕ a) = max(a)
max(c ⊕ b) = max(b)
 =⇒ max(c ⊕ a) ≤
max(c ⊕ b)
2. In the case max(a) ≤ max(c) ≤ max(b) we have:
max(c ⊕ a) = max(c)
max(c ⊕ b) = max(b)
 =⇒ max(c ⊕ a) ≤
max(c ⊕ b)
3. In the case max(a) ≤ max(b) ≤ max(c) we have:
max(c ⊕ a) = max(c)
max(c ⊕ b) = max(c)
max(c ⊕ a) = max(c ⊕ b)
 =⇒ max(c ⊕ a) ≤
max(c ⊕ b)
5.3.2. Monotonicity
A routing metric is left monotonic if the path cost will
not decrease when prefixed by another path. Formally,
(S ,⊕, f ,≤) is left monotonic if ∀a, c ∈ S , f (a) ≤ f (c ⊕
a). This means, (ERNT,⊕, f (max),≤) is left monotonic
if ∀a, c ∈ S ,max(a) ≤ max(c ⊕ a).
For a given prefixed path c, two cases could occur:
1. In the case max(a) ≤ max(c) we have:
max(c ⊕ a) = max(c)
max(a) ≤ max(c)
 =⇒ max(a) ≤ max(c⊕a)
2. In the case max(c) ≤ max(a) we have:
max(c ⊕ a) = max(a)
}
=⇒ max(a) ≤ max(c⊕a)
5.4. Discussion
Our solution is flexible and depends on the context
according to weights associated with trust calculation,
to the ERNT metric object flags, and to trust-related
thresholds. From one side, nodes executing MRTS can
dynamically modify the weights, wi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}), ac-
cording to rules specified by the context. Hence, our so-
lution allows a trade-off between security effectiveness
(honesty and selfishness) and QoS requirements (energy
efficiency and ETX) depending on the weights dynamic
changes defined by each IoT application. For instance,
in our study, we set the weights initially equally, and
then we adjusted them according to security breaches
detection (honesty and selfishness). In another case, w1
and w2 could be greater than w3 and w4. If the energy
saving is the most important, w3 could have the greater
value. In another case, an application could switch to
active (secure) mode and sets w1 and w2 to greater val-
ues if the energy state is greater than a threshold (Emin),
and switch to passive (non-secure) mode if the energy
state is less than a threshold.
Even though some degree of selfishness is allowed for
nodes to save their resources, in the present study we do
not consider reintegration of isolated nodes once clas-
sified as untrusted. In some cases the reintegration and
backup of untrusted nodes can be required (e.g. to sup-
port fault tolerance). Nevertheless, considering a rein-
tegration mechanism raises new problems regarding the
effectiveness of the solution, such as preventing nodes
from abusing the mechanism. In this context, if the BR
sets the I flag (in the ERNT object) to 1, the parent se-
lection process permits the selection of untrusted nodes
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in the set of parent, whereas, if I is set to 0, the par-
ent selection process does not allow the insertion of un-
trusted nodes in the set of parents. This flexibility can
be seen as a reintegration mechanism, in which the bor-
der router switches the I flag between 1 and 0 according
to the necessity of the application context (fault toler-
ance). However, rules need to be designed to handle
this reintegration carefully.
In the simulation study, we noticed good results re-
garding energy consumption. However, our solution
could not always get the right balance between the is-
sues of energy efficiency and security. The setting of
the threshold parameters Tsel f ish and TTrust is a trade-off
issue, and no value can fit all scenarios and criteria. For
instance, in a scenario in which security is of great con-
cern, TTrust value needs to be as high as possible while
Tsel f ish value needs to be as small as possible. This way,
malicious and selfish nodes would be isolated quickly.
Nevertheless, the topology could be more frequently un-
stable, leading to more energy consumption. Besides, if
TTrust is too big lots of nodes might be isolated, and thus
the proper functioning of the network can be affected.
Since MRTS is built upon the RPL protocol, it in-
herits both its advantages and disadvantages. Indeed,
the developers of Contiki-ng4 confirmed that because
of supporting new functionalities from standards and
Internet drafts, the implementation of RPL becomes
more complex and thus gets a large ROM footprint. In
MRTS, each node maintains the list of all its neighbours
with the necessary information to calculate trust values.
Hence, if the network scales up, the neighbours’ list will
increase, and obviously, nodes will need more storage
capacity. Indeed, the storage limitation of LNN objects
is still a big challenge, especially for large scale routing.
As presented by Xiyuan et al. [47], the challenge is to
find a balanced solution that reduces the memory over-
head risk while improving the utilisation of the node ca-
pacity. In our future work, we are going to test the per-
formance of MRTS in the case of large scale networks
and highlight the issues and the solutions.
The collaborative (cooperation) isolation gives
MRTS many advantages. From one hand, it permits to
reduce false positives. From the other hand, since all
neighbours cooperate in the evaluation of a given node,
even if two successive nodes misbehave, MRTS can de-
tect and isolate them.
Table 3 gives a comparative of MRTS with other so-
lutions used to secure RPL from routing attacks.
4The contiki OS for Next Generation IoT Devices that implements
new functionalities to enhance RPL. Readers can reach the documen-
tation online at https://github.com/contiki-ng/contiki-ng/wiki
6. MRTS : a Strategy For Cooperation Enforcement
Following MRTS, the participation in the network op-
erations is conditioned by the trust value of each node;
this means, if TOF classifies a node as untrusted, it will
be discarded from the network. As a result, there is no
advantage for a smart, rational intruder to misbehave be-
cause it will be discarded from the network. As conse-
quence, nodes in the network could achieve the effective
cooperation, and MRTS can be seen as a stable strategy
of the interactive nodes within a repeated game. The
network will then obtain service of higher security and
trust between the cooperating nodes. In this section,
we introduce our system model and explain how we
mapped MRTS into a strategy for the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD)5. Then, we analyse the MRTS strategy
formally and compare it to other strategies using sim-
ulation software, with regard to cooperation promotion
and evolution.
6.1. System Model
We used the non-zero-sum non-cooperative iterated
PD game as the conceptual foundation for modelling
interaction between the nodes of an MRTS-based net-
work, as well as the trust decision making process for
each node, which finally results in cooperating (trusted)
or defecting (untrusted). From the security point of
view, cooperating and defecting nodes correspond to the
fact nodes execute the network’s operation correctly or
misbehave, respectively. In the context of this work, a
misbehaving node is either a selfish node, an intruder
that trigger attacks against the network, a node with not
enough energy, or/and a node with not a good ETX.
These pieces of information are abstract for mathemat-
ical modelling. Every two players engaged in the game
(decision process to cooperate or defect -trust or untrust-
) play simultaneous moves PD in every stage of the
game. After every stage, the players reveal all infor-
mation -trust values- about the previous stage. In the
first stage, all players cooperate (trust), and then in-
truder nodes will defect (untrust) while normal nodes
will choose either to cooperate or defect according to
other players’ moves in previous stages. We define
MRTS as:
1. Cooperate on the first move;
5The PD is a non-cooperative game with imperfect information
that can be applicable in many domains. The PD can be extended to
a multi-player or a repeated game and it is the basis for many models
used to analyse the performance of networks’ routing protocols. For
more details please refer to [48][49][50].
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Table 3: Synthesis of security solutions for RPL
Works Technique Collaboration Attacks Disadvantages Validation
[16] IDS No Rank, sinkhole,
DIS, and neighbour
attacks
More overhead because of the amount
of information needed by the cluster
head. Less accuracy detection after 10




[22] IDS No Sinkhole, Rank, se-
lective forwarding
High false detection rate and the lack of








[31] Trust No Selective-forwarding
attack
The solution does not deal with bad-
mouthing and good-mouthing attacks
because each node takes a decision
based only on its own knowledge. If
this node misbehaves, it will choose a
failing path rather than a trusted one.
Uses only one parameter (packet for-
warding) to calculate trust
Simulation
(J-Sim)
[32] Trust No Network-level-
attacks
Uses only direct trust. Vulnerable to
bad-mouthing and good-mouthing at-
tacks. Uses only one parameter (packet





[33][34] Trust No Rank, Sybil, Black-
hole attacks
Uses only one parameter (packet for-
warding) to calculate trust. Vulnerable




[9] Trust Yes Routing attacks No simulation analysis to verify the ef-
fectiveness of the model against routing






Yes Blackhole, Sybil and
Rank attacks
The programmed code size does not fit
into the objects’ (Tmote Sky) available
memory. Massive and complex compu-
tation with too much information to use
and store. No details of the integration
method of the model to RPL. No details







Yes Blackhole and Rank
attacks
Although the solution presents good
performances regarding packet deliv-
ery, energy consumption and rank
change, further investigation is needed







2. In each period observe the past opponent’s actions
and count the number of defection (which corre-
sponds to its trust evaluation): nbD;
3. If nbD < Threshold Cooperate else Defect for the
remainder of the game.
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In section 6.2, we will give the equilibrium analy-
sis of the proposed MRTS strategy and compare it with
other known strategies. The equilibrium tells us about
the most rational choice for each player in the game in
a particular situation, and the network follows that by
either isolating misbehaving nodes or not.
6.2. MRTS Strategy Analysis
Defection is the equilibrium in the one-shot PD game.
Likewise, in a finite repeated PD, the only equilibrium is
to defect, and it represents the Sub-game Perfect Equi-
librium (SPE) . However, it is not the only equilibrium
in an Infinitely repeated PD (IPD). Indeed, it is possible
to have cooperation as an equilibrium because players
can anticipate future rewards and punishments. It can
be different equilibria in repeated games [49].
According to [48][49][50], each player i has a re-
peated game strategy si = (s0i , s
1
i , ..., s
T
i ), where each
sti is history-dependent, the game is repeated T peri-
ods (stages), and T can be infinite (T = ∞). Formally,
we represent each MRTS strategy of a player i as a se-
quence of history-dependent stage-game strategies such
that in equation 13; where, C: Cooperate, D: Defect,
(C,C)t: means (C,C) repeated t times, and (D,C)nbD:




C if t = 0 or ht = ((C,C)t)
C if hnbD = ((D,C)nbD) and nbD < Threshold
D if hnbD = ((D,C)nbD) and nbD ≥ Threshold
(13)
So, is it an equilibrium for two players to play MRTS
for this iterated PD game? We will look to the game as
two phases’ game: The cooperation phase and the de-
fection phase. In the cooperation phase, no one has de-
fected previously, so both players are cooperating. In
MRTS, the defection phase itself is divided into two
sub-phases: the defection-cooperation phase and the
defection-defection phase. In the defection-cooperation
phase opponent defects either alternatively or contin-
uously, while the player cooperates until the number
of defection is equal or greater than a defined thresh-
old. In the defection-defection phase, the number of
opponent’s defections exceeds the threshold and thus
defection-defection is played forever. We will check if
in any of these phases of the game a player will need to
deviate from MRTS strategy, with the assumption that
the other player also is adopting MRTS strategy. It is
assumed that the environment for the repeated game is
stationary [49], and thus the payoff matrix is the same
in every period. In this analysis, to calculate repeated
game payoffs, we use PD payoff matrix6 from Table 4,
and formulas from [49]7.
Table 4: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix
XXXXXXXXXXPlayer 1
Player 2
Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) (R,R) (S,T)
Defect (D) (T,S) (P,P)
6.2.1. Cooperation Equilibrium
For IPD, there are infinitely many equilibria, and it is
possible to have an equilibrium in which both players
always cooperate; this is what we will see in follow-
ing. If both players cooperate on the first-period t = 0.
Therefore, at period t = 1, the history is h1 = (C,C);
so they both play cooperatively again. As consequence,
at period t = 2, the history is h2 = ((C,C), (C,C)); and
so on which generates an infinite path of (C,C). Thus,
assuming that cooperation is an equilibrium, we calcu-
late the repeated game Equilibrium Payoff (EP) to each
player as in equation 14, where δ8 is the discount factor




δtR = R + Rδ + Rδ2 + Rδ3 + ... + Rδn (14)
Thus, the average equilibrium payoff is : EP = R
The question is: can any player gain from deviating
from cooperation given that other players are accurately
following it? Several cases can occur: defecting k times
from the first period, defecting k times from the xth pe-
riod, and defecting k times extended on several periods,
where k > 0. It must be remembered that by follow-
ing the MRTS strategy, if player 1 defects, player 2 will
cooperate while the number of defection is less than
the threshold. In other words, (MRTS, MRTS) strategy
at period-(t+1) depends not only on what is played at
period-t but also on previous plays.
Case 1)-1: If player 1 defects in this first period and
continues defecting k times (Threshold = k),
he/she will have a payoff of T for the first k de-
fections and then a payoff of P for the remainder
6If both players cooperate they both get a cooperation reward (R).
However, if only one cooperates then the cooperating player gets a
sucker score (S) whereas the defecting player receives a selfish temp-
tation salary (T). Finally, if they both defect they both get a selfish
punishment (P).
7http://virtualperfection.com/gametheory/5.2.InfinitelyRepeatedGames.1.0.pdf
8The discount factor allows to bound the stage-game payoffs and
thus allows the infinite sum of the weighted payoffs to be finite.
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of the game. So the payoff for the defecting player








= T + Tδ + ... + Tδk−1 + Pδk + ... + Pδn
(15)
Thus, the average defection payoff is :
DP = T (1 − δk) + Pδk.
A player will continue cooperating according to
the MRTS strategy if the following condition
holds: EP ≥ DP (i.e., R ≥ T (1 − δk) + Pδk), and








Case 1)-2: If player 1 cooperates, and then defects in
the xth period, and continues defecting k times,
he/she will have a payoff of R for the x first pe-
riods, a payoff of T for the k defection times, and
then a payoff of P for the remainder of the game.











= R + Rδ + ... + Rδx−1
+ Tδx + ... + Tδx+k−1
+ Pδx+k + ... + Pδn
(17)
Thus, the average defection payoff is :
DP = R(1 − δx) + T (δx − δx+k) + P(δx+k − δn)
Such as in case 1)-1, a player will continue cooper-
ating according to MRTS strategy if EP ≥ DP (i.e.,
R ≥ DP = R(1− δx) + T (δx − δx+k) + P(δx+k − δn)),
and thus if inequality 16 holds.
We conclude that cooperation is an equilibrium (i.e.,
every player will be willing to cooperate forever) as long
as the condition 16 holds. In other words, if the value
of the discount factor δ is as in inequality 16, the devi-
ation is not profitable (i.e. we mean by deviation k de-
viation times). Indeed, in the case of defection and for
sufficiently patient players, there is a trade-off of getting
a good payoff for k-defection-stages and then suffering
for the rest of the time. As already stated in the litera-
ture, higher δ means more patience from a player, more
care for the future, a higher chance for surviving into
the next stage, and consequently enabling greater coop-
eration.
In this analysis, we do not present the case where
the player defects k times extended on several periods.
Nevertheless, we believe that the biggest gain a player
can have by defecting is to play defection at the k first
periods since the discount factor decreases more and
more with time. In other words, the defection equilib-
rium payoff (DP) for any choice of defection periods
is weakly less than the cooperation equilibrium payoff





K . As a result, the player willingness
is to cooperate rather than defect. The simulation re-
sults in section 6.3 demonstrate that the cooperation is
maintained regardless of defection positions (periods).
What matters is the number of defections throughout the
game.
6.2.2. Defection Equilibrium
Can any player gain from deviating from defection
strategy, given that other players are accurately follow-
ing it? Two cases could occur:
Case 2)-1: If nbD through ht is greater than or equal
to the threshold, then play (D,D). If both players
arrive at a sub-game of mutual defection forever
(D,D) (after ”k = threshold” defection times), this
sub-game consists of the IPD. Playing the stage-
game Nash equilibrium (D,D) of a game that is
being infinitely repeated (in this case, PD) is an
equilibrium itself [49]. Thus, if the two players
are defecting forever, the best response for both of
them is to continue defecting forever, and no one
will need to deviate.
Case 2)-2: If nbD through ht is less than the threshold
then play (D,C). According to MRTS, the punish-
ment phase is reached when nbD equals the thresh-
old and it corresponds to Case 2)-1. However, if
player 2 deviates from playing C before reaching
the threshold, he/she plays (D,D) and the Case 2)-
1 applies, where both players play the equilibrium
path (D,D) forever. So, it is the best response to
him/her to deviate from this phase of the strategy.
From another hand, if player 1 deviates from play-
ing D, he/she plays (C,C), and thus both players
play the equilibrium path (C,C) forever. Conse-
quently, the best response to him/her is also to de-
viate from this phase of the strategy.
MRTS is a complex strategy which can be an SPE9 or
not. Under the condition of threshold equal to 1, it is
equivalent to the Spiteful strategy, which makes it SPE.
From the MRTS strategy point of view, the whole pe-
riod where a player defects while the other player coop-
erates and the number of defection is less than a thresh-
old is equivalent to the cooperation period (i.e., (C,C)).
9Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium [49].
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Thus, the limit when nbD reaches the threshold corre-
sponds to the one-shot deviation. In other words, the
overall defection period can be reduced to the one-shot
deviation, making it like Spiteful. Nevertheless, when
playing (D,C) or (C,D), if there was a deviation and
we enter the punishment phase (D,D) forever, no player
will want to deviate again since this guarantees a mini-
mum gain of P for both players. Likewise, if there was
a deviation and we enter the cooperation phase (C,C)
forever, no player will want to deviate again since this
guarantees a gain of R for both players. Like the tit-for-
tat strategy, these two beneficial deviations imply that
MRTS is not SPE.
6.3. Simulation Results with Perfect Vs. Imperfect
Monitoring
Axelrod [51][52][50] was the first to organise com-
puter tournaments to numerically detect strategies that
would favour cooperation among players in the iterated
PD. To this end, authors used ecological evolution al-
gorithm for finding the optimal and robust strategies.
At the beginning of the execution, there exists the same
number of population for each strategy. A round-robin
tournament is executed inducing the population of bad
strategies to decrease whereas good strategies obtain
new players. Because game theory is developed based
on the understanding that all involved players are ra-
tional, when a defecting player discovers that benefit of
cooperating players is higher than defecting ones, it will
change its strategy in order to get higher benefit. There-
fore, the proportion of players with different strategy is
changing with time. Thus, the process is iterated until
the population does not change anymore. ”At the end,
the good strategy is the one which stays alive in the pop-
ulation for the longest possible time, and in the biggest
possible proportion”.
In this section, we present a numerical analysis of the
performance of the MRTS strategy in term of coopera-
tion and cooperation evolution among nodes. We com-
pare MRTS to other known strategies; always cooper-
ate (all c), always defect (all d), tit-for-tat, Spiteful, and
soft-major. In the tit-for-tat strategy, each player starts
the game by cooperating, and for all the future stages,
each player copies the opponent’s move from the pre-
vious stage. In the Spiteful strategy, each player starts
by cooperating and continues to cooperate as long as
everyone has cooperated previously. In the soft-major
strategy, each player cooperates, then plays the oppo-
nent’s majority move, and if equal cooperate. Both all c
and all d strategies are history-not-dependent. We con-
sider two cases: perfect and imperfect monitoring and
use for the simulation a software introduced in [53]. We
implemented the MRTS strategy and added it to the list
of strategies in [53]. As inputs, each strategy begins the
simulation with a population of 100 players and com-
petes in a round-robin tournament. Besides, we use the
payoff matrix in Table 4, where P = 1, T = 5, S = 0,
and R = 3.
6.3.1. Perfect Monitoring
As depicted in Figure 6a, the MRTS strategy won the
tournament equally with tit-for-tat, Spiteful, and soft-
major. This achievement implies that MRTS is an Evo-
lutional Stable Strategy (ESS) of the IPD game, and is
equivalent to the three other strategies as an evolution-
ary strategy to favour and enforce cooperation among
players. Figure 6b shows that MRTS is as good as other
strategies to promote cooperation and cooperation evo-
lution since it was ranked eighth out of 38 strategies
involved in the simulation, with a size of 228 players.
These results give the conclusion that the MRTS pun-
ishment strategy enforces the cooperation of participat-
ing nodes and prompts smart adversary nodes to become
honest and cooperative.
6.3.2. Imperfect Monitoring
It is unrealistic to model real-world scenarios with the
assumption of a noise-free environment, for instance,
in the case of errors due to IDS monitoring tools, link
quality, and promiscuous mode. The software intro-
duces noises when playing the game to simulate imper-
fect monitoring. When we make the imperfect monitor-
ing assumption, different results appear. Indeed, for a
defection threshold of 10, the MRTS strategy performs
better than the other strategies when the noise percent-
age is in-between 4% and 10%. It is the most evolu-
tional stable strategy (ESS) of the IPD game (See Fig-
ure 7a and Figure 7b). As depicted in Figure 8a, we no-
tice that when the noise is significant (25%), the strategy
soft-majo performs better than other strategies. Never-
theless, MRTS still performs better than Spiteful and
tit-for-tat. As depicted in Figure 8b, when the noise
is about 45% to 50% even if MRTS loses players, it
stabilises after 90 generations with a population of 55
players, and thus performs better than other strategies
such as tit-for-tat, which dies after 33 generations and
Spiteful after 65 generations. However, when the noise
exceeds 50%, the MRTS strategy disappears after 149
generations but still better than tit-for-tat, which disap-
pears after 34 generations and Spiteful after 67 genera-
tions.
We can explain the results above as follow. By
adopting the MRTS strategy, a node bases its decision




Figure 6: MRTS Compared to Different Strategies Under Perfect Monitoring.
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both on observations that it made on its opponents’ past
moves and a predefined defection threshold. Thus, the
trust measure evaluated by the node takes into account
more than one observation. Thus, the behaviour of the
MRTS strategy does not depend on the noise percent-
age. Instead, it depends on the misperception noise it-
self and the threshold. Two cases could occur: i) in the
first case, the misperception noise is cooperation instead
of defection, and the threshold is not reached so the co-
operation phase is extended and thus MRTS performs
better. ii) in the second case, the misperception noise
is defection instead of cooperation, and the threshold
is reached quickly, so the cooperation phase is short-
ened, and thus MRTS disappears faster. In other words,
the MRTS strategy will maintain the equilibrium state
of cooperation when there exist small defection devia-
tions, and the threshold is not reached, or when case i)
occurs.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented MRTS: a cooperation-
trust-based routing mechanism for RPL. According to
MRTS, at each hop of an RPL routing path, the child
node selects the node that has higher trust value, more
energy and better link quality as its preferred parent. We
proved with a simulation study that MRTS using multi-
criteria based trust as routing metric (ERNT) is an ef-
ficient mechanism to reduce the network security risks
and maintain its performance and stability. Indeed, re-
sults show that MRTS has less energy consumption and
more packet delivery ratio due to both: its capacity to
detect and isolate attacks and to its energy balanced
topology mechanism. Furthermore, we demonstrated
that ERNT fulfils the isotonic and monotonic properties,
hence allowing MRTS-based routing protocol to satisfy
the requirements of consistency, optimality and loop-
freeness.
In this paper, we also translated MRTS into a strat-
egy using game theory concepts. The MRTS strategy
makes the malicious non-cooperative nodes be punished
(by decreasing their trust values) and isolated, and thus
enforces the security of the network by enforcing nodes
to cooperate rather than cheating. We analysed the co-
operation evolution of the MRTS strategy and demon-
strated mathematically and with a simulation that nodes
in the network could achieve effective cooperation and
the MRTS strategy will become the stable strategy of
the interactive nodes. Furthermore, the simulation study
showed that the MRTS strategy is an evolutional stable
strategy, and under perfect monitoring, it is equivalent
to the tit-for-tat and the Spiteful strategies to favour and
enforce cooperation among nodes.
As future work, we plan to experiment and analyse
MRTS performances in a real testbed and for large scale
networks. Furthermore, we will extend MRTS with
more criteria such as mobility, and test its functionali-
ties against different trust thresholds and other routing
attacks.
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